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A.tmtractmThis paper ~ts  an overview of the ECO (English COnversational System) family 
formaUmm of semantic network. In the paper, we describe the components of our semantic network, 
dil~umlng its raft,ability u a re~tat ion  of propositional knowledge. The use of our semantic 
network am a uniform repr~entation mediating between specialised repre~nt&tions appropriate to 
particular task donmi~ (e.g., understanding atural languages, etc.) is di~m~md. 
We motivate and explain acomprehensive n twork formalism. Special problenm with respect to the 
use of logical connectives, quantifiers, descriptians, modalities, and certain other constructions that 
fail in conventiomd semantic networks, are systenmtically resolved with exte2mione to conv~ational 
network notations. The representation harmonizes with linear one-dlmendonal logical notatione, 
illustrating the close kimfldp of the two notations. This Idnshlp supports the claim that networks 
have inherited form~ interpretability from logical notations. 
Several immes of network form and content, which are more fundamental than the choice of a 
network syntax, are addressed. These issues are: (i) primitive versus nonprimitive representatione; 
(ii) the separation of proportional content of text from pragmatic aspects; and (Ui) network normal 
form venus ad b0c systenm. The design of computer systems for specific tadm depends in part on 
early commitments o these i~ues. 
The succ-|~tnc~m, clarity, and intuitive nature of semantic networks axgues in their favour if only 
for purely methodological advantages. Semantic networks are readable; they suggest procedures for 
comprehension a d inference, and the computer data structures which they resemble. Examples 
will demonstrate how associative processing algorithmi and complex pattern matching operatious 
are readily identifiable using networks. These examples are given in the context of natural language 
undemtAnrli~ utilizing networlm in a state-based conceptual representation. 
We discmm how to superimpose or~jufisational strategies into the network representations, begin- 
nln~ with the representation f lexical information and extending to the superimposition f topical 
orLrAn;~tiOns in the knowledge base. Several special purpose inference mechanisms extend the top- 
ical orgaui~tion we superimpose on concepts to aid retrieval of other typ~ of information about 
concepts. The use of networks is assessed and promising areas for future research are described. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Semant ic  networks have s t imulated ebate about  their use as a proposi t ional  knowledge repre- 
sentat ion  in reasoning and understanding systems since Qui l l ian's introduct ion [1,2] and their  
subsequent  general izat ion by other researchers [3-18], etc. Ear ly  on, semant ic  networks were suc- 
cessfuUy explo i ted for concept learning [19], natura l  language understanding [5-7,11,12,20-24], 
and deduct ive reasoning [25]. They were also influential in psychological theories of cognit ion 
[26-28], the ear ly development of knowledge representat ion languages [4,29-31], the implemen- 
ta t ion  of  semant ic  network processing systems [32], and machine architectures [33-35]. More 
recently, var iants of semant ic  networks have been uti l ized in various inher i tance mechanisms. 
Many, if not most, of the ide~m contained herein are due to L.K. Schubert, our teacher and friend. He is currently 
at the Department of Computer Science, Univendty of P~ochester, Rochester, New York. 
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Initial misconceptions about the use of semantic networks in knowledge representation were 
widespread. By the end of the 1970's, however, both semantic network and predicate calculus 
representations were recognized as formal languages designed to allow natural language state- 
ments to be paraphrased precisely and unambiguously and whose respective reputations could 
be attributed to the use to which each had been put. Research efforts based on semantic net- 
works emphasised associative and other non-deductive processing whereas the predicate calculus 
was usually wedded to resolution-based theorem proving. It then became widely recognized that 
theorem proving techniques could just as easily be adapted to semantic network representations 
or non-deductive inference algorithms could be designed for predicate calculus. 
The natural development and influence of semantic networks can be found in current knowl- 
edge representation and object-oriented languages. Data engineers and knowledge representation 
researchers, concerned with the need to formally understand the expressive power and represen- 
"tational adequacy of various data and knowledge representation schemes, have returned to logic 
to provide a basis for such investigations. Inventing and revivifying various formalisms in logical 
terms provides a basis for comparison and has led to the development of new non-monotonic 
logics to handle incompleteness, default reasoning and other unique requirements. These devel- 
opments are having an effect on network proponents; [36,371 provide overviews of network-based 
and other data and knowledge representations. 
A review of the early and ad-hoc development of semantic networks is given in the editor's 
introduction to this issue. We report on what has come to be known as the ECO (English 
COnversational System) family formalism of semantic network. From 1974-78, a young assistant 
professor with aeronautical engineering experience, Len Schubert, and his graduate students Nick 
Cercone, Randy Goebel, and Al Covington designed the extended semantic network formalism 
and began early investigations of network organisation and efficient network retrieval which laid 
the foundation for much of the present work. Particular attention was paid to the use of the 
network for representing troublesome natural language constructions. Schubert and subsequent 
Alberta graduate students Mary Papalaskaris, Jay Taugher, Johannes de Haan and Stephanie 
Miller designed special methods for accelerating deductive inference for taxonomies, colours, 
parts and times in a topically organised extended semantic network. We recount the Schubert 
formalism [7,9,10], and its continued development herein. 
2. EXTENDING THE EXPRESSIVE ADEQUACY OF SEMANTIC NETWORKS: 
A BASIC NETWORK FORMALISM 
We examine semantic network representations of knowledge, discussing their suitability as a 
representation of propositional knowledge. The use of semantic networks as a uniform represen- 
tation mediating between specialised representations appropriate to particular task domains is 
considered. 
2.1. A Data Structure for Semantic Information Processing 
Early on, Shapiro attempted to extend the expressive power of semantic networks, [15,32]. He 
introduced the important distinction between the conceptual relation and the structural relation. 
Structural relations are used to form the basic structure of the semantic network represented 
exclusively by non-conceptual arc labels whereas conceptual relations are represented by nodes. 
Shapiro also calls structural relations item relations and conceptual relations are referred to as 
system relations. 
Shapiro's repertoire of meaningful entities included individuals (particular concepts), properties 
and relations (generic oncepts), and propositions. The knowledge attached to a concept is the 
set of propositions in which it participates plus, possibly, relevant procedures. 
A network syntax allowing arbitrary nesting of quantifiers and propositional operator acopes is 
emential and one such syntax is discussed in the next section. The first complete representati~ for
quantifiers was introduced by Shapiro. He treated every and some as relations between sentences 
and individuals (the variables are assumed quantified) occurring in those sentences. Thus a 
quantified sentence such as "Everyone loves Mary" involves two propositions nodes: one for the 
open sentence [[z person] --~ [z loves Mary]] and another for the proposition that the relation every 
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holds between z and the open sentence. This method of quantification is syntactically complete 
but seems semantically unsatisfying since unbound variable nodes, open sentence nodes, and 
relations over such nodes are not intuitively meaningful. 
The use of Skolem functions to represent quantification i  networks dispenses with variable- 
binding operators and thus introduces no meaningless nodes. For example, z 3 y [y taller-than z] 
becomes [y(z) taller-than z]. The universal quantification of z is implicit, and y(z) is the Skolem 
function supplying a specific individual that is "taller-than" x corresponding to each z. 
The importance of Shapiro's early contribution was largely ignored until the mid 1970's when 
the concern for foundations in knowledge representation theory became of paramount importance. 
2.2. A Comprehensive Network Formalism 
Schubert, Cercone, and Goebel motivate and explain a comprehensive network formalism, 
[11,12]. Special problems with respect o the use of logical connectives, quantifiers, descrip- 
tions, modalities, and some other constructions that fall in conventional semantic networks are 
systematically resolved with extensions to conventional network notations. The representation 
harmonizes with linear one dimensional logical notations, illustrating the close kinship of the two 
notations. This kinship supports the claim that networks have inherited formal interpretability 
from logical notations. 
To unify previous network formalisms and extend their expressive power to include quantifiers, 
operators, and higher-order predication, Schubert et al. developed a canonical form of a semantic 
network. Schubert's network notation is a uniform representation, mediating between the spe- 
cial purpose representations which are necessary for representing and processing different ask 
domains. It is intended as a standard of comparison and serves to illustrate concepts of language 
comprehension. 
We highlight he basic notation developed earlier, and present a few more complex examples to 
illustrate the expressive power, notational efficacy and logical adequacy of the network formalism. 
The Basic Notation 
Semantic networks are graphical analogues of data structures that represent facts in a computer 
system. Solid loops are used as nodes that represent either explicitly diagrammed proposition 
nodes or existentially quantified concept nodes. In the first case, propositions form the basic unit 
of knowledge represented by the notation. In the later case, nodes may be labeled with names 
for the concepts they denote, for example, John, book, bookl, ... ; ordinary attributive terms 
such as book are reserved for the corresponding universal concepts, while numerically suffixed 
words such as bookl are used for particular instances of the concepts. Unbroken lines are used 
as arcs linking parts of a proposition to proposition odes. Arc labels are simply distinguishing 
marks. They are analogous to parentheses or commas in the predicate calculus in that they relate 
denoting terms syntactically; they are non-denotative themselves. Whenever possible they will 
be chosen to enhance readability and be suggestive of meaning, but numeric labels could also 
be used, [38]. To avoid confusion, predicate names will be designated in small letters and arc 
labels by capital letters. An example of a simple network is offered in Figure 2.1a. An English 
paraphrase of Figure 2.1a is: proposition P1 represents he English sentence "John loves Mary," 
P2 represents "Helen loves John," P3 represents "Helen dislikes Mary," P4 represents "John gave 
Mary a red dress," P5 and P6 serve to identify the particular ed dress which John gave to Mary. 
Occasionally the detailed use of arcs and nodes in the explicit notation of Figure 2.1a will 
clutter a diagram, reducing readability. Figure 2.1b illustrates an abbreviated form of 2.1a with 
the understanding that the structure is built upon explicit propositions. The full network is 
abbreviated by coalescing the predicate node into the proposition ode, removing the solid loop. 
A Comprehensive Network Formalism 
The basic semantic network was extended with notation for logical connectives, conventions 
for indicating quantifier and operator scopes, including n-ary and higher-order predicates, and 
providing formal interpretability for each construction. The notation extends the expressive 
power of the network, making it equivalent to high-order and modal logics. 
98 N. Ci~RcoNg e~l eL 
:IG2 ARG1 A~ ~ v  
(a) A Simple Network. 
"~gm'tl ARG2 ~" dYress 
Iogtl '---love1 
l ~disl ik.,  
(b) Its abbrevi,*ted form. 
Figure 2.1. 
Notation .for Logical Connectives 
Logical connectives, ignored in most network formalisms, occur frequently in discourse and 
are necessary for truth-functional completeness. In Schubert's semantic network notation logical 
connectives are represented as explicit nodes for logical compounds of propositions (or open 
sentences), with graphical inks to the components. Figure 2.2 represents the English sentence 
(exploiting the logical "if"), "If either the Mets or the Pirates win and the Expos take second 
place, then I'U recover past losses and either buy a eolour TV or fly to Greece." The figure 
illustrates the formation of disjunctions and conjunctions explicitly by the use of graphical links 
to tokens of the disjunction and conjunction operators. The operator-opermad links of the logical 
operator axe represented by broken hnes in Figure 2.2. Observe that no distinguishing marks are 
needed on the links of disjunction or conjunction (they are symmetrical operators) and arrowheads 
can be dropped when there is no ambiguity. The use of past as a modifier of losses is an evasive 
manoeuvre; it postpones discussion of time. Other logical connectives can be introduced in the 
same way. 
In a semantic network containing logical compounds it is not suitable to regard all propositions 
in the network as asserted. In this formalism we adopt the convention that the complete semantic 
net asserts exactly those propositions which are not constituents ofcompound propositions (that 
is, operands of connectives or modal operators). Graphically this means that precisely those 
propositions are asserted which axe not pointed to. We must devise a method for asserting a
proposition which is also a constituent of a compound proposition. The assertion of a constituent 
simplifies any logical compound. For propositional attitudes, causes, intentions and the like, 
however, it may prove worthwhile to assert a proposition independently of the compound. In 
this case, we can use disjunction with a single operand, V -+ p (where V means "or"), as a way 
of saying p holds since the compound proposition established by the token V is not pointed to. 
Representing QuantiJiers in the Semantic Network 
One prominent use of semantic network representations i cludes natural anguage under stand- 
ing systems. Any representation f natural language must include quantifiers uch as "All boy 
scouts do good deeds," and "several of my friends were on strike today." General knowledge 
relies upon quantifiers as in "It is always raining on Long Beach." Definite descriptions implicitly 
make use of quantification as the example "the people of China" shows. The meanings of complex 
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I'll recover my past losses and either buy a colottr TV or fly to Greece. 
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action concepts require quantification, such as "walking" which has associated with its definition, 
assertions uch as at all times, some of the limbs of the individual engaged in walking support 
the individual. 
Quantification challenges semantic network representations to indicate the scopes of universal 
and existential quantifiers. The notation used is analogous to quantifier-free normal form in pred- 
icate calculus. Propositions are in prenex form (quantifiers have maximum scope), existentially 
quantified variables are Skolemized, and universal quantification is implicit. To distinguish be- 
tween them, we simply use solid loops for existentially quantified concept nodes (as in all previous 
figures), and broken loops for universally quantified nodes. Graphical Skolemization then links 
each existentially quantified node to all universally quantified nodes on which it depends (that 
is, whose universal quantifiers precede the existential quantifier in prenex form). Dotted lines 
represent these dependency links to distinguish them from propositional and logical links. For 
example, "Every critic admires ome painting" is represented as shown in Figure 2.3a. In predi- 
cate calculus notation this is (Vz) [critic(z) ~ (3 y)(painting(y) ~z admires(z, y))] or critic(x) --* 
[painting(f z))& admires(z, f(z))], Skolemized. Now if we can assume (3 y)(painting(y)), that 
is, there is at least one painting (or alternatively, that there is at least one critic), then this be- 
comes painting(f (x)) & [critic(z) -* admires(z, f(z))] which corresponds to the slightly simpler 
diagram shown in Figure 2.3b. Here the painting proposition is no longer considered as a conse- 
quent of the critic proposition. This type of simplification is often suitable for encoding natural 
language statements, ince we do not usually communicate in terms of propositions which are 
trivially true by virtue of the nonexistence of their referents (which is not to say that we do not 
communicate about nonexistent entities). The diagram for "There is a painting which all critics 
admire" differs from Figure 2.3b only in the absence of the dependency link between the painting 
and critic nodes. 
The proposed method of representing quantification is applicable only to propositions in prenex 
form. If we deal only with existential logic (one in which all propositional constructions are 
truth-functional), no generality is lost, though clarity is occasionally compromised. However, 
propositions involving (nonextensional) modal operators uch as necessarily and believes cannot 
be converted to prenex form. To represent such propositions, the present notation is expanded 
to allow arbitrary embedding of quantifiers. The generalised scope notation allowing non-prenex 
propositions is illustrated in Figure 2.3c. Note that scope inclusion links establishing operator 
precedence over quantifiers run from proposition odes to variables, not from operator nodes to 
variables. If the diagram were given in full form instead of using the abbreviated notation this 
would be explicit. Other examples of higher-ordered constructions are given in [11,12]. 
Techniques for representing knowing and believing apply equally to other propositional atti- 
tudes such as remembering, supposing, intending, deciding, avoiding, hoping, imagining, pre- 
tending, and trying. Nonreferential terms (words without particular eference, e.g., self-defining 
words such as numbers, etc.) within the scopes of such operators (whichever ones are deemed 
useful independently of the others) can be identified by means of scope dependency links. The 
same applies to the deontic modalities uch as obligation. It should be obvious, for example, how 
"John ought to marry the prettiest girl" would be represented. 
Causal dependency is an important modality deserving attention. "John asked Mary to dance 
because she was the only girl left without a partner" is an example of an opaque context generated 
by a causal construction. Substitution of the term Mary for its referential synonym the only girl 
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left without a partner clearly fails: "John asked Mary to dance because she was Maxy." As in 
other modal constructions, we may need scope dependency links to express causal structures. 
The standaxd logical quantifiers 3 and V axe unsuitable for expressing many natural anguage 
quantifiers such as several, many, most of, a few, more than, etc. These quantifiers can be handled 
systematically with (fuzzy) properties of set csrdinality and relations between set cardinalJties, 
plus standard set relations uch as set inclusion. We can classify natural language quantifiers 
according to their indication of set size from absolute to comparative, where comparative indica- 
tors are those comparing the size of one set to that of another set. The logical quantifier 3 (there 
exists) is an absolute indicator of set size since (3 z) P(z) tells us that the set of P's contains at 
least one member. The quantifier V (for all), by virtue of its equivalence to 3, is also an absolute 
indicator. In the context (Vz) [P(z) --* Q(z)] however, where the number of P's is finite, it can 
be considered a comparative indicator of set size. It tells us that the subsets of P's that axe Q's 
is as large as the set of P's itself. Common absolute quantifiers are none, one, two, three, . .., 
several; common comparative quantifers are all of, most of, a small fraction of, a slight majority 
of, one-half of, two-thirds of, as many as, twice as many as, etc. Some quantifiem show both 
absolute and comparative attributes, especially some and many, For example, in "many axtifi- 
cial satellites axe orbiting the globe" many is used absolutely--it appears to imply a cardinality 
of at least about a dozen. In "many students attend John's class" many is used in the sense 
considerably more than attend the average class. Bartsch &~ Vennemann discuss this particular 
use of many in [39]. They do not consider the absolute indicativeness of many, however, nor of 
its comparative use in selecting a subset of another set, as in "many of the world's people axe 
undernourished." Contrast the numerical in dication here with that in '~any of the apples in 
the basket were rotten." 
Recognizing the absolute/comparative behaviour of quantifiers, we can describe them system- 
atically by means of predicates on set cardinality and on pairs of set cardinalities. In Figure 2.4 
the convention for abbreviating implication is shown, that is, single broken lines axe used for the 
conjoined antecedents and solid lines for the conjoined consequences. The predicate # denotes 
the number of elements of a set, or rather the single-valued relation which holds between a set 
and the number of its elements. We regard # as a function from sets onto integers and several 
as a (fuzzy) property of numbers. If we accepted "several" as a possible value of set size, then it 
would be impossible to talk about the size of the set, as # would be many valued (for example, 
a 6-element set might have both size 6 and size several). 
Representing Definite and Relational Descriptions 
Natural anguage representations u ually ignore the distinction between definite and indefinite 
descriptions, o the method for representing both types of descriptions i shown here. The repre- 
sentation of both definite descriptions (the little old lady at the door) and indefinite descriptions 
(a big apple) are based on the conventions for logical connectives and quantifiers already intro- 
The ECO f,,m|ly 
. _ .  
4" ", / x 4. (' ~ osr .,--~, - x ~--,---~ ) c Fords "-, "-v / "w"  
~Jon # # where ( 1rod c indio~te the set operttors 
(~ ~P nem4y ss large es ~ membership end °°ntejnment resp ° t ive ly#ls  th. ostd nslit operslor 
-- "XseYersl ,< is the rel~ionel operator less then or equal 
101 
Figure 2.4. Several cars were on the lot; most  of thean were Fords. 
duced rather than on a description operator such as used in [40]. Description operators are useful 
only at a superficial level of language representation, and in the domain of pure mathematics. 
The description "John's car" conveys the presupposition that John has exactly one car. This 
is true at least for certain discourse contexts. The non-equivalent proposition that John owns a 
red car does not necessarily convey the uniqueness condition has been expressed in John's car. 
The use of equality leads to a convention which is suitable for definite descriptions ofsets, such as 
"the SOCRED supporters of British Columbia," as well as for "John's car." Figure 2.5 illustrates 
the representation f a definite description of sets, where S is a set. 
-,)-->ill informed 
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Figure 2.5. The SOCRED supporters of British Colmnbi,~ are inlnfonned. 
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Figure 2.6. Loving one's neighbours is a virtue. 
virtue {Ax [(y)[neighbour(~, 1/)loves(x, y)]]} 
The notation for descriptions as introduced is inadequate for descriptions of predicative con- 
cepts which are expressed in terms of predicates of the same, rather than higher, type. For 
example, suppose we wish to say that the property human is the same as the property ratio- 
hal animal; note that the latter property is of type 1 and is expressed in terms of the type 1 
properties rational and animal. We cannot diagram this statement on the basis of the formula 
(Vz)[human(z) :=~ rational(z)& animal(z)], since this merely asserts extensional identity (that is, 
the set of human beings equals the set of rational animals). The desired statement of intensional 
identity can be made with the aid of Church's lambda (A) operator. This operator abstracts a
predicate from an open sentence by designating certain variables of the sentence as arguments of
the predicate. Thus we write human = Az [rational(z) & animal(z)]. A more interesting example 
is provided by the sentence "Loving one's neighbours i a virtue," which requires abstraction of 
the monadic predicate loves one's neighbours from the dyadic predicate loves. This example is 
shown in Figure 2.6, using a graphical analogue of A-abstraction. 
A-conversion is accomplished by means of a (solid) A-link from the proposition expressing that 
an individual oves all of his neighbours to the node for the individual. In general, graphi- 
cal A-abstraction i volves the construction of some open sentence (possibly with embedded A- 
expressions), and A-conversion of some of the variables of the sentence. Open sentences are formed 
exactly like propositions, except hat some of the participating concept nodes are regarded as 
free variables. A-conversion is symbolized by A links from the node corresponding to an open 
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Traviata. 
sentence to free variables of the sentence. In the nonmonadic case ,~ links are labeled A-A, ,~-B, 
etc., (or in some other systematic way) to distinguish the arguments ofthe abstracted predicate. 
A Note about Time 
During development of our extended semantic network formalism, time was regarded as the 
only situational or contextual variable that needed to be added to action propositions, [41]. 
This contrasted with eontempory viewpoints at that time, e.g., [23,24,42]. We used time in 
instantaneous (a proposition can have either a fixed or variable moment of time associated with 
it) and interval modes. Within this framework, temporal relations including tenses (which can 
be built up from more elementary temporal relations) could be defined as was done in [43]. Thus 
we were able to represent sentences like "While he was in Rome, before he met his murderer, he 
first sang in La Traviata" as in Figure 2.7. Time, as we now regard the endeavour, is presented 
in Section 6.1. 
Primary issues of network form and content need to be addressed. These issues include: 
(i) primitive versus nonprimitive representations; 
(ii) the separation of propositional content of text from pragmatic aspects; and 
(iii) network normal form versus ad hoc systems. 
The design of computer systems for specific tasks depends in part on early commitments to these 
issues. These ideas are detailed elsewhere, see [4,9,10,17, etc.], and summarized next. 
3. WHAT SHOULD BE REPRESENTED, WHY, AND HOW 
Application designers face fundamental representation, organisation, and processing issues 
early in their approach to design, and choices are critical. The designer must decide what should 
be represented, the form of the representation, and the level to which the representation is re- 
stricted. On the basis of these considerations, we argue in favour of a non-primitive semantic 
network representation in which propositions are organised in normal form determined by the 
concept hierarchy. 
3.1. The Problem with Semantic Primitives 
The expressive power and formal interpretability of the state-based representation, [7], contrasts 
with the conceptual dependency [CD] representation, [20], and the preference semantics [PS] 
representation, [44]. We compare the methods of CD and its descendants ( ee Lytinen in this 
volume) and the PS family (see Wilks and Fuss in this volume) with the network oriented state- 
based representation in order to argue against he use of a small number of very general primitive 
predicates for representing meaning in natural anguage utterances. 
CD, epitomized initially in the MARGIE system, [24], is rich in semantic representation a d 
designed to assist paraphrase, inference, and machine translation. CD represents meaning struc- 
tures with a graphical notation that divides words into four conceptual categories. In addition, 
CD used only a small number of primitive actions from which all other actions are derived. 
PS also utilizes primitives to represent the meaning content of natural language statements. PS 
was initially devoted to machine translation of small input paragraphs from English into French. 
The ECO f~-nily 103 
When arguing for or against he use of primitives, an essential decision must be made between 
using a large number of highly specific predicates, on the order of the number of words in the 
language, of only a small number of very general primitive predicates, as espoused in CD and 
PS theories. Since primitives would have to be carefully chosen to permit reconstruction of all 
word senses, they are difficult to determine. Also, we claim that embedding the minimal content 
of terms into a minimum conceptualization (creating primitives) does not facilitate the human 
interpretive process. The original term itself suggests what content we could infer in addition 
to the minimal content. This idea of inference can be ef~ciently programmed in a semantic 
structure by inserting probable inferences with direct reference to the word definitions, as will be 
demonstrated in Section 5. This is simpler than analyzing the minimal representation a d then 
looking for applicable inference rules. 
In defending PS, Wilks argues, in response to criticisms in [45], that a primitive expansion or 
paraphrase requires a less complex match than does the original English word standing for the 
paraphrase, [46,47]. Since PS does not operate in paraphrase mode, Wilks' uses arguments about 
the paraphrase mode of CD's primitive based system. Examining CD's defense of primitive-based 
systems, we find the following advantages are enumerated: 
(1) paraphrase relations are made clearer; 
(2) similarity relations are made clearer; 
(3) inferences that are true of various classes of verbs can be treated as coming from the 
individual (primitive) ACTs. The inferences come from ACTs and states rather than 
from words; and 
(4) organisation i  memory is simplified because much information eed not be duplicated. 
The primitive ACTs provide focal points under which information is organised. 
The increased clarity of paraphrase and similarity relations derives from CD's use of canonical 
form rather than a primitives-based meaning representation, see [11,12] for detailed arguments. 
The last two advantages also cannot be traced to the use of semantic primitives. Sharing infer- 
ences within classes of verbs can be accomplished without restating words in terms of primitive 
ACTS. In Section 5, a detailed example is given which demonstrates that both eats and drinlcs 
as sentential forms that share in the implications that a single primitive, say ingests, would store 
but conserves storage and computation. 
Moreover, while we see no disadvantages of non-primitive based representations, point (4) 
shows a major disadvantage in their elimination, namely the resultant need for matching complex 
primitive representations i tead of originally simple propositions. Examining a typical restaurant 
script such as proposed in CD literature, [23,48], for "John dined at a restaurant" convinces 
us of the complexity of matching. The CD method stores John's actions in the restaurant 
as a sequence of scenes, partially obtained from the restaurant script, which represent several 
successive conceptualizations about restaurant dinings. An inquiry such as "Did John dine at a 
restaurant?" requires another construction of the complex succession of conceptualizations about 
restaurant dining. Then the succession of conceptualizations would have to be matched. The 
task is not trivial. PS's entire primitive-based system is spared this complication since the system 
was designed for sentence by sentence translation and not question answering. 
Furthermore, we maintain that no representation f meaning is adequate until it captures many 
of the same notions that people realize when they comprehend language utterances. Our version 
of what walking means to people, see Section 4, is at least an order of magnitude more complex 
than the definitions CD and PS allow for walking, since their formulas also admit other complex 
concepts uch as running, skipping, skating, and hopping under the same meaning formula. Our 
example demonstrates that the extended semantic network formalism was equal to the repre- 
sentation task and also dramatized the actual complexity of ordinary concepts when expressed 
in the primitive-based representations of CD and PS. The meaning formulas of primitive-based 
representations do single out properties most frequently needed for comprehension and simple 
inferences. This is their remaining salient feature. The primitive-based representations do cap- 
ture major properties of defined concepts and we have only added minor details to them. But to 
rely on meaning caricatures as CD and PS do, ensures that comprehension will remain of a crude 
sort. Non-primitive based representations can be equipped with the advantages of the CD-PS 
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approach, simply by providing lists of the most frequently needed properties for comprehension 
of each predicate and permitting the significant properties of concepts to become independently 
accessible without invoking the full meaning representation defining the concept. 
The complexity of a concept does not interfere with its matchability since it is retrieved by its 
name. Considerations ofstorage conomy and the computational complexity of pattern-directed 
retrieval convince us of the limited value of primitive-based representations. 
3.~. Propositional Content and Pragmatic Aspects 
Is it sufficient o extract he propositional content of sentences and use that as the basis of 
representation, or should the representation also reflect aspects of meaning such as speaker inten- 
tion, presupposition, connotation, and style? An example from [17] demonstrates the significance 
of these various aspects of meaning. In [17], it is argued that the sentence 
The dog that bit the man had rabies. (3.1) 
should not have a representation identical to the sentence 
The dog that had rabies bit the man. (3.2) 
even though the propositional content for (3.1) and (3.2) is identical, that is, there is a dog, 
there is a man, the dog had rabies, and the dog bitthe man (ignoring, for simplicity, temporal 
considerations). The argument is continued, correctly, that the differing descriptions of (3.1) 
and (3.2) are inappropriate criteria for accessing the memory node for the referent of either 
description. Further insistence is made that (3.1) and (3.2) intuitively mean different things, so 
syntactic distinctions must be made between the meaning expressed in the relative clauses and 
the meaning expressed in the main clauses. Perhaps this position is derived because the author 
believes that intensional and extensional entities must be represented by different sorts of nodes 
in a semantic network. For example, according to [17], in some contexts the prettiest blonde 
refers to only Sally Sunshine, yet in other contexts the prettiest blonde depends on the notion 
conveyed by the descriptive phrase. In [17] these contexts are distinguished by different sorts of 
nodes (or sub-networks). We believe that terms (or nodes) already encompass both extensions 
and intentions, and that a syntactic distinction is not appropriate to distinguish extensional and 
intensional nodes. It is appropriate to explain the conditions under which a term contributes 
to the truth value of a sentence through its intension rather than through its extension alone. 
In [17], the differentiation between intensional and extensional entities parallels the distinction 
between transparent and opaque readings which can be illustrated by the sentence "John wants 
to marry the prettiest girl." The syntactic distinction lies in the relative scope of the wants modal 
operator and the existential quantifier of the example sentence. [For sake of simplicity we ignore 
the additional ambiguity of whether the prettiest girl refers to the time of John's wanting or the 
time of John's marrying.] 
We propose that a distinction be made between the propositional content of sentences and 
their pragmatic aspects. Different pragmatic aspects generate the different meanings of sentences 
like (3.1) and (3.2). We agree with [17] that the internal meaning representation of a sentence 
should reflect both its propositional content and its pragmatic aspects, but the two sorts of 
information should not be inextricably mixed. Mingling propositional and pragmatic information 
would handicap comprehension processes which must utilize any acquired knowledge. The special 
syntactic representational device in [17] would also encumber the matching process since the 
matching processes seeking suitable referents for (3.1) and (3.2) would depend on the original 
text. In contrast, CD theory has presented convincing reasons why an internal representation 
should be in a canonical form, relatively independent of the original English sentence. Mingling 
propositional and pragmatic information about utterances would disperse pragmatic information 
about a particular section of discourse over the propositional data base. Information about 
speaker intentions and assumptions would be buried with knowledge about dogs, people, etc. We 
maintain that a separate model for discourse status (speaker intentions and the like) is necessary. 
This model is the proper place for semantic information. 
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3.3. Network Form 
We limit our discussion of the form of representation to the issue of property inheritance. 
In [49], property inheritance is examined more assiduously using a new paradigm of beliefs and 
democratically (socially) determined context. 
The extended semantic network notation is capable of expressing any arbitrary proposition 
expressible in English, for example, see [8,11,12,31,50]. But any system designed for reasoning 
about the real world must also effectively exploit property inheritance within generalization hier- 
archies. Conceptual entities typically consist of many components and the relationship between 
these components provides valuable information. We require a mechanism which allows inher- 
itance of the relationships from components o corresponding components within a conceptual 
entity. For example, the attachment relationships between the body parts of birds would require 
nontrivial inference processes to transfer to other similarly structured animals. 
The method of variable-sharing was proposed by [51,52], and adapted by us to solve this prob- 
lem and allow for trivial transfer of relationships. We recommend that the knowledge associated 
with a generalization hierarchy be stored as a set of implicative propositions which share one 
universally quantified node and any number of existentially quantified nodes dependent on the 
universally quantified node. The antecedents of the implications involve the universally quan- 
tiffed node as argument and correspond to concepts making up the generalization hierarchy in 
the manner of hierarchies described above. Thus the implieants of a concept are accessible by 
topic rather than a long list of propositions involved in the concept. This mechanism facilitates 
addition of new information and we speculate that it is possible to organize other than monadic 
concepts, say relational concepts, hierarchically as well. This mechanism is explained in greater 
detail below in Section 5.3. 
4. REPRESENTING NATURAL LANGUAGE USING 
EXTENDED SEMANTIC NETWORKS 
A general theory of natural anguage understanding requires representations with sufficient 
expressive power to represent the meaning content of ordinary language. Schubert's extended se- 
mantic network notation possesses this expressive power. We now present a development of some 
ideas concerning the semantic network representation f individual items of factual knowledge in 
a computer, where this knowledge is thought of as being conveyed to the computer in natural 
language. 
4.1. The Basic Framework 
The basic framework embodied by many natural language understanding systems i the (actor- 
action-object) formalism. Certainly this is not without justification. Much of natural thought 
and communication follows from this framework. Only a deeper analysis of actions and intentions 
seems to belie thinking of this framework as underlying natural anguage. While not denying 
the intrinsic value to organisation, heuristic programming, and pragmaties that this (actor- 
action-object) formalism suggests, its theoretic value for beginning investigations into language 
eompreheusion is minimal. 
A more basic starting point uses extended semantic networks to represent many natural an- 
guage constructions in a neutral state-based representation, explicitly representing the propo- 
sitional content of language utterances. At times, explicit comparisons are made between CD 
theory and PS theory on the one hand and the extended network approach on the other. 
4.2. States, Events, Actions, Cases, Causes, and Intentions 
Sentences such as 
The sun was turning red and approaching the western horizon. (4.1) 
raises many questions about the CD and PS formalisms. In (4.1), the motion of the sun must 
be done by somebody or something whereas its change of colour cannot be done by somebody 
or something. Thus, using the (actor-action-object) formalism espoused by both CD and PS, 
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modes of behaviour which are expressed by actions must have actors whereas all other modes of 
behaviour cannot have actors. In the case of the (apparently) moving sun in sentence (4.1), one 
is hard pressed to identify the actor. Consequently we are compelled to regard certain ongoing 
activities which intuitively just happen as instigated by someone or something (including natural 
forces in a vague, unspecified sense). 
Just as we are compelled to regard certain ongoing activities as instig,~ted by somebody or 
something, we are denied the option of regarding certain actions as having an agent as shown in 
John was hurting Mary by pulling her hair. (4.2) 
In (4.2), the hurting not being an action, has no actor whereas in 
John was dragging Mary by pulling her hair. (4.3) 
the dragging, insofar as it involves PTRANS'ing does have John as an actor. We may wonder 
by what criterion we draw the line between what an actor does and what he causes. In (4.2), 
according to CD theory, we are to regard the '~urting" as caused by the "pulling" action. But 
the same is true of PTRANS'ing in (4.3). Furthermore, ven direct bodily action such as moving 
an arm can be viewed as caused by muscle contraction or, subjectively, as caused by an act of 
will, either of which again may have antecedent causes. 
It seems to us that no structural primitives hould be associated with actors at all. Instead 
we propose a neutral representation in which events are expressed as sequences of states of the 
participants. The successive states imply express what happened, without explicit commitment 
as to who did it. Agent(s) in an event can be identified by supplementary propositions. The 
notion of an agent can continue to be used to aid interpretation a d inference. Agent would be 
regarded as a rather fuzzy higher level concept, understood by the system in terms of the role of 
a supposed agent within a sequence of causally and teleologically related states. In the sentence 
"John uprooted the sapling" the term agent can be considered highly applicable to John's role in 
the event while in the sentence "The avalanche uprooted the tree" its applicability to the role of 
the avalanche would be considered relatively low. The notion of an agent seems to depend in part 
on causal priority of a state of the supposed agent in the sequence of states under consideration, 
and in part on the extent o which purposive behaviour can be ascribed to the supposed agent in 
general, and in part to the extent o which the particular sequence of states which he initiated 
can be assumed to be intentional on his part. 
Similarly we propose to separate wh~/something happened (causes, enabling conditions, reasons, 
explanations, justifications, and the like) from what happened. This does not prevent us from 
including causal propositions in the representation a d relying heavily on them for interpretation 
and inference. However, time relations and changes of state, not causes, will give coherence to a 
set of propositions as an event. 
CD's instrumental case relation between actions can and should be represented in terms of cau- 
sation and intention. If a system has a conceptualization t  the effect hat John was PTRANS'ing 
the ball by PROPEL'ing it, then this conceptualization should also express that the PROPEL'ing 
was causing the PTRANS'ing. Phrases ostensibly expressing instrumental ctions often express 
no more than causation. An example is the by clause in 
The effluents were killing the fish by raising the temperature of the water. (4.4) 
When there is a difference, it lies in the intimation of purposive causation. In 
John woke Mary by blowing his trumpet. (4.5) 
purposive causation is expressed, while in 
Mary woke up because John was blowing his trumpet. (4.6) 
it is not. Sentences (4.5) and (4.6) clearly show that the instrumental relation amounts to a 
causal relation supplemented by intentional states. 
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Since the inception of conceptual dependency theory and preference s mantics, there have been 
many changes to them. An early criticism of [7], apparently still somewhat valid, has largely been 
amended. Both theories now appear to have the conception of a state. 
According to [53], actions are to be thought of as a proper subclass of events. In an inter- 
pretation of CD, an action is something a nominal can be said to be doing at some moment. A 
study of CD's proposed inferences shows that an action does not express a definite change in a 
situation; rather it expresses existence of a situation which tends to produce change, and all ac- 
tual changes must be inferred. Formulas for actions in PS theory are analogous but less explicit. 
Actions, then, express modes of behaviour which promote but do not guarantee the occurrence of 
events. For example, the actions PTRANS, INGEST, MOVE do not express changes in location; 
instead those changes are primary inferences given that an actor is PTRANS'Ing, INGEST'ing, 
or MOVE'ing something. Syntactically, the relationship between an event, say a change in lo- 
cation, and the action, say PTRANS, whose primary inference is that event, corresponds quite 
closely to the relationship between verbs and their participles respectively. To say that John was 
PTRANS'ing himself with the result that his location changed is quite analogous to saying that 
he was going somewhere with the result that he went there. 1 In any case the term action is now 
seen to be quite misleading, since it normally connotes the occurrence of definite vents, rather 
than the existence of a dynamic situation which tends to generate vents. 
Thus CD's actions correspond more closely to states than to events! To say that A is 
PTKANS'ing B is merely to express a momentary truth about the system in which A and B 
participate, not a change in that system (which remains to be inferred). This view is compatible 
with the observation that many common modifiers express ubtle blends of passive and dynamic 
attributes. The examples, blue sky --+ bright sun -+ glowing (or luminous) candle ---, burning can- 
dle --, blazing fire -+ billowing smoke, bring to mind conceptual images that illustrate agradually 
increasing emphasis on dynamics. CD's actions, and, as far as we can determine, PS's as well, are 
dynamic states, or activities, or modes of behaviour which mediate changes in certain attributes. 
Thus PTRANS and MOVE mediate changes in location, INGEST and EXPEL mediate changes 
in containment, and MTRANS mediates changes in awareness. 
We believe that the recognition that actions in CD's sense are essentially states rather than 
events is important, since it leads to a uniform view of all (true) events as sequences ofstates. In 
this view the need for identifying actors of events does not arise, nor is it necessary to delineate 
the spurious boundary between passive and dynamic states. 
We now illustrate our representation f states and events. Nothing new needs to be added to 
the basic network notation of Section 2. We regard any condition which can hold momentarily 
(blue, moving, running, etc.) as a state. Accordingly, any atomic proposition which is based 
on a time-dependent predicate is a state proposition. Figure 4.1 shows two concurrent state 
propositions: something (the redness of the sun) was increasing throughout some time interval 
and something else (the distance between the sun and the horizon) was decreasing throughout 
the same time interval. 
,~AL  ~ TI 
t  same time interval. 
- - -  decmaLs ing  J , 
Figure 4.1. The sum was getth~ redder and approa~ the horizon. 
Actually there are two additional state propositions, concerned with the existence of unique 
values of redness and distance at all moments of time within the time interval of interest; these 
have not been made explicit since they can be taken to be implicit in the redness and distance 
relations. 
1Urdike in CD, we do not regard he waa Ooin 0 and he went as equivalent; we claim that he went there, )1n1|]¢¢ he 
~s going there, affirms that he did arrive at his destination, and that it is decidedly odd to say he tue~t hem ~ut 
didn't get there. 
CAH~ 23:2-5-H 
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Events involve a change in state as "the last leaf fell from the tree" illustrates. The definitive 
characteristic of state changes is the following: if a system has property A at time tl, and 
property B at time t2, then A ::~ B is a change of state if and only if A and B are mutually 
exclusive properties, for example, A - solid, B - liquid; A -- round, B - rectangular. In fact 
a state attribute such as colour which can assume various values can consistently be defined as 
a set of mutually exclusive properties, each member of the set being regarded as a value of the 
attribute. This admits both qualitative attributes such as colour as well as quantitative attributes 
such as location. Figure 4.2 shows a simple event involving a single change of state of a system 
with one component (Mary). The time relation then implies immediate succession of the two 
time intervals. 
awoke[ ] before--)(nowt) 
~teep[ 1 
Figure 4.2. Mary fell asleep. 
Our representation f the sentence "John hit Mary" is shown in Figure 4.3a. A paraphrase is 
the following. Some unknown mode of behaviour of John caused some object to move quickly 
toward Mary. Subsequently the object reached Mary and exerted a force on her. Note that we 
have a state and an event here, viz. John's unknown state and the event of the object moving 
toward Mary and striking her. In accordance with our earlier remarks about causation, the 
causal connections between John's state and the ensuing event does not make John's state part 
of that event. Only exclusive and successive states of a particular system of objects form events. 
A natural inference in Figure 4.3a would be that John intentionally hit Mary, that is, that the 
missing state of John is that he was trying to bring about the event in question. We represent 
trying by the state predicate z has active goal y at time t, as illustrated in Figure 4.3b. The 
explanatory paraphrase goes as follows. The cow was on the ground, propelling itself towards a 
location above the moon; then it was moving toward that location; then it was at that location; 
then it was moving towards a place of destination on the ground, such that the moon is between 
the place of departure and place of destination; then it was at the place of destination. Note 
that moving towards could have been represented in terms of distance decreasing as shown in 
Figure 4.1. 
An important consequence ofour very broad conception of states is that new complex states 
(modes of behaviour) can be defined in terms of events involving primitive or previously defined 
states. The time of occurrence of these eventa can extend some distance backward and forward 
from the moment at which the new state is defined to hold, For example walking is defined 
in terms of successive states of motion and displacement of the walker's feet and body over a 
period of observation encompassing (say) two steps, since an instantaneous snapshot of a person 
is insufficient for deciding whether or not that person is walking (although it may of course supply 
enough cues to prompt he inference that the person is walking). A tentative definition of walking 
is given below. 
Complex dynamic states (modes of behaviour) such as walking, running, dancing, tumbling, 
flickering, etc., can be constructed in terms of more elementary states. The constructions are 
necessarily as complex as the states they describe. Complexity can result from the intricate coor- 
dination of several simultaneous activities (for example, rolling expresses rotation and translation 
at coordinated rates), or from complex time dependencies (for example, flickering), or from both 
(for example, walking). 
Since we intend to exploit fully the semantic "preferences" that any given predicate induces on 
its arguments, we propose to make use of cases in our approach to representation. For example 
the predicate moving prefers a physical object as its first argument and a physical location as its 
second argument; he predicate has-active-goal prefers a sentient being as its first argument and 
a state proposition as its second argument. Furthermore, there are broad similarities between 
the argument preferences of different predicates. For example, several predicates prefer animate 
objects in certain argument positions. We certainly can and sometimes do acknowledge such 
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(a) John hit Mary. 
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(b) The cow jumped over the moon. 
Figure 4.3. 
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simi lar i t ies and give a rough indicat ion of the sort of preferences involved by using suggestive 
argument  markers uch as ANIM,  THING,  D IRECT ION,  PLACE,  etc., instead of noncommit ta l  
markers  such as A, B, C , . . . .  However, we do not think that  these markers can be chosen so that  
they express not  merely similar but  identical argument roles and semantic  preferences, no mat ter  
in which predicate they occur. 2 
Thus semant ic  cases, while certainly useful heurist ical ly in f inding or inferring arguments  of 
predicates have no universal or pr imit ive status.  
4.3. Complex Concepts 
Accord ing to CD's  dict ionary, if a human, X ,  walks to a location, Z,  then X PTRANS's  X 
by X MOVEing the feet of X in the direction of Z. This formula rules out  walking on one's 
hands and knees, or walking on one's hands (admit ted ly  a rare skill). More important ly ,  the 
formula admits  running, skipping, hopping, jogging, shuffling, and even skating. Presumably,  
then,  the d ict ionary entry  is not intended to capture the full meaning of  walking as we seem to 
unders tand  it, but  only those aspects which are most essential to language understanding and 
2This view is supported in [39]: " . . .  case is entirely a surface category and not, as suggested in [54], a category 
of universal semantics. Semantic representations are based on propositions, which consist of a relation (wary 
predicate with n _> 0) with a finite number of arguments filled either with constants or with bound variables. The 
"m~Aning" of an argmnent as argument is entirely determined by its relation. Therefore, no two arguments have 
precisely the same meaning, as m'guments. Thus, if the meaning of an argument as argument is ca~ed a case, 
then there are as many cases as there are arguments, and this number, if it is finite at All, is a very large one. 
What some linguists call "cases" axe classes of arguments based on certain semantic similarities which follow from 
the semantic similarities of their relations. The fact that certain arguments show similarities in their syntactic 
behaviour, such as tending to occur in certain position relative to the verb or belonging to the same surface case, 
does not support he assumption that there exists a small number of universal cases. Those syntactic similarities 
are simply a consequence of the fact that the human mind is structured in such a way that it tends to group 
objects on the basis of certain relevant similarities and then manipulate the objects of the group ,dik,." 
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inference. Similarly PS formulas are incomplete. For example, it is correct o say that DRINK 
implies 
((*ANI SUBJ)(((FLOW STUFF)OBJE)((*ANI IN)(((THIS (*ANI (THRU PAIiT)))TO)(BE CAUSE))))) 
but not the converse (which could mean someone was receiving an enema). So again a selection 
of only some linguistically important features has apparently been made. 
More complete meaning representations are required. Further information will be required for 
adequate comprehension f ordinary discourse. Much more information will surely be required 
to match the human ability to describe concepts and reason about them. For example, suppose 
we ask a reasonably articulate person to describe human walking in as much detail as po~ible. 
We might elicit at least the following information: Each foot of the walker repeatedly leaves 
the ground, moves freely in the walking direction for a distance comparable to the length of the 
walker's legs (while staying close to the ground), then is set down again, and remains in position 
on the ground, supporting the walker, while the other foot goes through a similar motion. The 
repetition rate is about one repetition per second. The legs remain more or less extended. The 
body remains more or less erect and is carried forward at a fairly constant rate. Further details 
could be added about flexing motions of feet, knees, and hips, the slight up-and-down motion 
of the body, typical arm motion, and forces exerted on the ground. Figure 4.4 shows a network 
which describes walking (regarded as a state predicate with three arguments besides time) along 
these lines. A few propositions have been omitted so as not to clutter the diagram. These are 
that each foot is also above the ground (and close to it) while moving, that each foot is also 
supporting X while stationary; that the duration of each of the unlabeled time intervals [ ] is 
approximately half a second; and that the speed of motion of the walker's body is approximately 
constant. There is no difficulty in adding these state propositions, except hat the last requires 
moving to have an additional argument, namely the speed of motion. Note that Its] is the time 
interval of observation of the walker, and that it contains t, the time at which X is said to 
be walking. Thus walking is defined by behaviour in the temporal vicinity of the moment of 
predication, specifically about two seconds of motion allowing about three or four steps. 
Fisure 4.4. Pro-son x WA]~nE at time ~ in direction d on ground g. 
Our representation f walking is limited since it is not applicable to unusual modes of walkins 
(for example, on hands and knees) or to animals. This limitation raises the queation: how many 
kinds of walking should be represented separately.* Also, is there a representation which expresses 
the common features of all kinds of walking? We have attempted such a representation in 
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Figure 4.5. The representation is based on the following characteristics of walking in general: 
1. it is done using limbs that are a subset of the limbs of the individual involved in the 
walking; 
2. the number of limbs involved is greater than or equal to two; 
3. at all times some of the limbs used for walking are in nousliding contact with the walking 
surface (this is not the same as saying some of the limbs are in contact with the surface 
at all times); 
4. each limb used for walking is stationary on the walking surface at some time and subse- 
quently is moving for some time; and 
5. the individual as a whole is in motion in the walking direction. 
The interesting feature of our representation is the use of quantification to describe the role of 
any number of legs in the walking. Note that without quantification, describing the locomotion 
of say, a millipede would be very tiresome. 
F-dur in~ .'[ti]c TI too' ,no 
i i l nb - . ,  . . -  m . . . .  :::..::::::::.....I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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pe~t: -of ".,,...," ................ thin " , , . . , J  
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Figure 4.5. ~c walking at t ime t in direction d on surface 9. 
A serious flaw in our representation f walking, and one for which we have no systematic 
remedy, is that we have ignored the fuzziness of many of the meaning components. For example, 
it seems necessary to put some constraints on the length of stride (lest the walker be allowed to 
mince forward in millimeter increments), yet to give an exact distance would be absurd. 
An important consequence of conceptual fuzziness, considering complex concepts, is that we 
can no longer draw a sharp boundary between extracting the meaning of an utterance and making 
probable inferences on the basis of the derived meaning structure. This is because we only find the 
probable meaning of an utterance. For example, the utterance "John built the house" probably 
means that he built a large, rigid-walled enclosure with a roof, separate rooms, etc.; but none 
of this is certain. The utterance "John was laughing" probably means that he was producing a
series of voiced sounds by staggered exhalation of air, and that his facial expression was merry; 
but he might have laughed silently, or his facial expression might have been derisive or even 
hostile. If we try to reduce semantic uncertainty by excluding from the meaning of a term all but 
its absolutely minimal content, and ascribe everything else to inference, we run into problems. 
In the case of house all that would remain would be a partial enclosure which accommodates a 
fenced-off ield, a shipping crate, or a jacket. In the case of laughing we would perhaps be left 
with spasmodic breathing and intent to convey amusement, which could suggest hat John is 
asthmatic and dancing a jig. 
Many concepts can be understood in different ways. For example, in "John was listening to 
the incessant chirping of the crickets," is chirping understood simply by its correspondence to a 
particular auditory sensation, or is it understood as a rapidly fluctuating, more or less uniformly 
high-pitched sound, or even as a complex variation of air pressure with time? Minsky's frame 
systems work, [55], strongly suggests that the kind of understanding of a concept we use at a 
given time is extremely task-and-context dependent. This surely casts doubt on the one-concept- 
one-formula approach to language understanding. 
4..~. Adjectives and Relative Terms 
Adjectives and relative terms are typically represented by drawing on a reference set. The 
notion of a reference set (a set of objects whose members are used for comparison with some 
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given object relative to some measurable attribute of the objects) is difficult to comprehend. 
While i t  is possible to define a more or less adequate reference set to account for "a large apple," 
it is not immediately apparent what the reference set would be if one were to ask a child to draw a 
large circle on a sheet of paper. This is a question above and beyond the one pointed out (rightly) 
in [39] concerning how the reference set is inferred from the context, especially extrwsentential 
context. 
We avoid some difficulties of having predetermined reference sets by making use of functors,  
The typical value functor applied to a concept with some measure attribute returns a value, for 
example, the typical value of size for man. Note that this is not the same as the typical man's 
size. The typical man's size is not readily determinable since it is hard to ascertain exactly what 
constitutes a typical man. A typical value functor is shown in Figure 4.7. We can abbreviate the 
typical value functor in a manner analogous to the collapsing of predicates in the abbreviated 
network notation. 
Descriptive adjectives are treated as conjoined predications in most cases, as shown in 
Figure 4.6a. Yet most adjectives appear to be comparative in nature regardless of their mor- 
phology. For example, big, small, tall, heavy, and so on are relative adjectives based on some 
measurable attribute of the object of focus. Figure 4.6b illustrates how comparatives would be 
diagrammed. The explanatory paraphrase of "John is bigger than Bill" is "John's size is greater 
than Bill's size." Often the comparative is implicit in the utterance. For example, in the sentence 
"John is a big man" the adjective "big" serves as a comparative. The associated paraphrase is
"John is a man and the size of John is greater than a typical value of size for a man." 
Ordinary discourse admits constructions such as: "John is the perfect man.," "Mary is the worst 
conceivable cook.," "In order to form a more perfect union ...  ," . . .  Modifiers such as perfect, 
ideal, and worst conceivable are problematic to represent because of the way they operate on 
what they modify. For example, we might formulate "John is the perfect man" in logical terms 
as:  
(VP)[[(Vz)[man(m) & P (z )*  :~ y-approves[P(z)]]] ::}P(John) 
where "=~ stands for "necessarily implies." 
where y is the speaker. The formulation reads "John has all properties such that y would approve 
of any man's having them." We can then easily formulate an expression for "someone is not a 
perfect man" by utilizing our formulation given above with the existential quantifier added (3 z) 
and replacing P(John) with P(z). Clearly, the method of handling comparative adjectives uch 
as big, tall, etc. does not work here. 
We make no definite proposals for handling adjectives such as perfect, ideal, worst kind of, best 
conceivable, tc., at any detailed level of analysis. A more superficial analysis of "Big John is a 
perfect fat man" is rendered as Figure 4.7. Additional information such as "John is a basketball 
player," can be easily added to the structure. 
4.5. Adverbial Constructions 
We draw attention to the major problem of representing adverbial meanings and suggest plau- 
sible methods for handfing adverbial constructions within the state-based conceptual franaework. 
Two major approaches treating adverbial modifiers include that of [39,57-59], who regard 
comparative adjectives ~,nd adverbs as operators which transform predicates, mad that approach 
due to [60], seemingly accepted by CD, 4 regards adverbial modifiers as second-order predicates 
that impose constraints on a specific relation, thereby restricting the class of specific relations to 
SAccording to [56], a functor is a symbol which, occurring as the first member of a sequence ofsymbols of certain 
syntactic kinds, makes a sequence ofthe same or another syntactic kind. 
4 Adverbs are diagrammed in CD as action modifiers without further analysis. Apparently CD is not conceg, ned 
with the meanings of genuine manner adverbials, however, see [21] for a dlscmmion ofadverbs uch as thoughtlessly, 
vengefully, etc. In the case of many adverbs (as in the case of many adjectives) this neglect is probably j ~  
since meat of the meaning content derives from perceptual processes. For example, in the sentence "Mary walked 
gracefully" it is dii~cnlt o paraphrase gracefully in more elementary terms. Essentially we know gracefulue~ 
when we see it. Perceptual tmdeerstanding needs to he supplemented only by a few additional facts for hmguage 
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which it may be a member. We consider the approach of [39], which seems promising but will be 
seen to have serious flaws. 
In [39], adverbial adjectival modifiers operate on noun meanings; they have semantic represen- 
tations with functors f such that f is applied to term z to map z onto a new term f ( z ) .  The 
contrast between "Ed owns a large car" and "Ed is running quickly" illustrates a problem with 
this approach. Whereas large in the first sentence has the set of cars as a reference set, and Ed's 
car is large relative to the average for that set, running quickly cannot he analyzed so easily. 
If the analogy were perfect then the reference set operated on by quickly would be the set of 
runnings, whatever that means; but clearly this set of runnings must be further restricted to the 
set of runnings Ed is capable of performing. Thus quickly appears to operate not on running 
alone, but on Ed running. 
In the case of running, the nature of the runner is being used to narrow the reference set to 
which we apply a measure function. In Ed is running quickly--quickly modifies running with 
respect o Ed's runnings, or, if we don't know Ed, at least to human runnings (assuming that 
Ed is human). Unfortunately factors other than the identity or category of the runner can also 
affect the meaning of quickly, as shown by "Ed is running quickly on his hands and knees," "Ed is 
comprehension, such as the fact that graceful motion is generally pleasing, ismore or less the opposite of awkward 
motion, is smooth and coordinated, etc. Other adverbial modifiers clearly require systematic analysis; quicldy is 
a good example. This term appears to say something about the speed of a~a ction or activity, comparing it to 
some standard. An adequate meaning representation for quickly should spell this out precisely. 
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running quickly on the moon," "Ed is running quickly in Chile," '~rhe cheetah is running quickly 
in the dense forest," "The cheetah is running quickly on the plain." The effect of locale on the 
meaning of quickly is seen in the contrast between the first two of these examples and between 
the last two of these examples. 
The context which determines the meaning of an adverbial modifier cannot he circumscribed 
once and for all. In general, adverbials must be allowed to interact with any specific and general 
knowledge available about the participants in (and setting of) an action. In the approach of [61] 
to the treatment of adverbial hedges Zadeh specifies (weighted) components of each fuzzy term 
on which a hedge may operate once and for all. Because he needs to specify these (weighted) 
components prior to using a particular hedge, his approach lacks generality. In our seman- 
tic network, we would represent "Charlie, the cheetah, is running quickly" as diagrammed in 
Figure 4.8, in keeping with the general approach of [39] hut taking our considerations into ac- 
count. 
PRED 
~A 
Figure 4.8. Manner adverlm as higher-order dyadic functions. 
It is well to note that the set of "quickly runnings" (on the plain, in the dense forest, etc.) 
required for comparison, may well be empty (if not, replace "on the plain" with "on the moon"). 
The reference set therefore, if it exists at all, is not of this world but of some imaginary world 
which is our conception of how difficult cheetahs would find the going if they were to run quickly 
on plains (or moons). In our formulation we apply the typical value functor to the lambda 
abstracted predicate "running quickly on the plain." The typical value functor does not presume 
the existence of a reference set. 
4.6. Opacity and Vagaries of Reference 
Some linguistic forms give rise to referentially opaque contexts. This is true of the propositional 
attitudes "believes that ... ," "knows that ... ," "wants to ... ," and others, as well as other 
modalities created by causal situations, intentions, and the like, and conditional statements 
including the counterfactual conditional. Quotation creates referentially opaque contexts. While 
"simpleton" may be referentially equivalent to "fool," the statement simpleton has nine letters 
does not allow substitution of "fool" for "simpleton." 
To illustrate how a referentially opaque context can block existential quantification, the sen- 
tence "John wants to marry a blonde." gives rise to two possible interpretations: 
"John wants to marry a specific girl who also happens to be a blonde." and 
"John has no particular girl in mind, but he wants whoever he does marry to be a blonde." 
The first interpretation, the transparent reading, can be existentially quantified, that is, there 
exists someone whom John wants to marry. The second interpretation cannot be quantified in 
like manner since it contains an assertion about an existential statement rather than being an 
existential statement. 
Various (equivalent) explanations have been given for this type of ambiguity. Philosophers 
tend to describe this as scope ambiguity of an existential quantifier. Some linguists however, 
prefer to portray the ambiguity as a distinction between a referential and attributive use of a 
noun phrase, With Schubert's notation the opaque reading of "John wants to marry a blonde" 
would be represented as shown in Figure 4.9. The transparent reading would be represented by 
Figure 4.9 if we took out the dotted line. 
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Both Montague and Lewis have developed theories that enable both the transparent and opaque 
readings for sentences to be generated, see [57-59,62]. This is not carried far enough. The 
important problem remaining is how to choose the correct interpretation in context. This problem 
is investigated further in [63,64] and a solution is proposed to choose the correct context. 
A 
.............. : blonde 
Figure 4.9. John has no particular girl in mind, but he wants whoever he does n~rry  
to be a blonde. 
We have taken a critical look at many problems of representing natural anguage statements 
in semantic networks and we suggested plausible methods for dealing with some of them. In par- 
ticular, the basic representation in terms of states and events, the definition of complex concepts 
(most importantly action concepts), the handling of adjectives and relative terms as well as ad- 
verbial modifiers were examined. Solutions to the problems that these topics present to language 
processing systems have been developed to the point that some of them have been incorporated 
into the experimental programs that support his research. 
5. SUPERIMPOSING ORGANISAT IONAL STRATEGIES  
5.1. Representing Lexical Information: English Word Meanings 
In the networks of [1,2], word meanings were represented bya network of objects and relations 
among the objects. To distinguish ambiguous meanings for pairs of words, the plausibilities of 
different interpretations were compared by the strength of the associations linking the various 
pairs of meanings, [1]. These networks were believed to contain the germina for a more sophisti- 
cated understanding of the relationship between meaning and grammar. Subsequent writers who 
used networks in their systems tried to further explore this relationship. 
CD represents meaning structures with a graphical notation consisting of items from four 
conceptual categories: picture producers [PP], picture aiders [PA], action aiders [AA], and actions 
[ACTS]. They correspond closely to nouns, adjectives, adverbs, and verbs, respectively. The 
conceptualization is CD's smallest structural unit; conceptualizations are graphical structures 
that link together conceptual categories using a variety of graphical symbols, conceptual tense 
markers, conceptual eases and primitive actions. 5 
We augmented the meaning representations of CD and PS, [5], utilizing semantic networks for 
the meaning representation f both the semantic and pragmatic information of a word concept. 
Our meaning representation is not based on primitives but permits efficient use of semantic 
preferences and is capable of accommodating unlimited amounts of information about complex 
concepts without loss of computational efficiency in the use of those concepts. The pragmatic 
and semantic information associated with the concept drinkl, the ordinary sense of drinking as 
in John drinks water, is illustrated in Figure 5.1. Note the constraints hat the drinker should be 
animate and the stuff drunk liquid. The major implication that z ingests y (or the subsuming 
concept ingest) in turn provides access to the irnplieations of ingesting. In this way CD-type 
and PS-type inferences are made available through property inheritance. Figure 5.2a shows how 
the ordinary sense of drinking can be modified to accommodate supplementary propositions to 
explain the implications associated with an alcoholic drinking. 
5CD used four cases: the objective ease, which relates an objective PP to an ACT; the recipient case, which 
relates A donor PP and a recipient PP to an ACT; the directive case, which relates direction (to and from) to an 
ACT; and the instrumental case, which link~ conceptualizations i trumental to an ACT to a conceptualization 
containing the ACT. In addition to conceptual cases, Schank makes use of only fourteen primitive actions through 
which he expresses all other actions. These primitive actions are: PROPEL, MOVE, INGEST, EXPEL, GRASP, 
PTRANS, MTRANS, ATRANS, SMELL, LOOK-AT, LISTEN-TO, CONC, and MBUILD. 
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Since ingest is not a primitive, it also has associated pragmatic and semantic properties. These 
are illustrated in Figure 5.2b. A paraphrase of the semantic formula says that if 2 ingests y 
through z, then some unspecified state or event causes stuff p to move towards the opening z 
and thii in turn causes g to assume a location inside t (without trying to be very sophisticated 
about thii point). 
5.2. Organising Neiwork Information 
Figure 5.1. The properties of drinkl. 
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The characteristic concept-centred organisation of semantic networks does not address repre- 
sentation issues but rather focuses primary concern with organising knowledge for effective use. 
Subsequent semantic network notations have been developed in an independent and applica- 
tion specific manner. Moreover, they have often blurred the important distinction between the 
representational and organisational aspects of network formalisms. 
Early efforts by Shapiro to imbue networks with increased logical power explicitly documented 
this distinction by contrasting system relations, items, and item relations. Schubert clarified 
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this distinction by demonstrating that a logical representation couched in network form offers 
the advantages of a propositional representation (that is, formal interpretability and expressive 
adequacy) while retaining the methodological advantages of the associative network organisation. 
His notation clearly indicated that an inteIHgent indexing scheme coupled with a database of 
logical formulae could indeed be considered to be a kind of semantic network. 
The basic distinction between the propositional content of a knowledge database and the access 
mechanism to that content has been noted in [29] 6 We wish to emphasize organisational aspects 
of semantic networks, in the tradition of [1,2], and in the spirit of [51,52], who writes, "If someone 
argues for the superiority of semantic networks over logic, he must be referring to some other 
property of the former than their meaning." The correspondence between semantic networks and 
logic has been established; the meaning of a given network is identical with the meaning of the 
equivalent logical expression. The object of our immediate attention is that structure which 
remains after paring the propositional content from a semantic network, that is, the indexing 
structure which provides concept-based proposition access. 
Organisational theories of knowledge can be characterized by the desire to cluster related 
knowledge into chunks. Ideally, these chunks should reduce the computation required to isolate 
knowledge relevant in a particular context. 
We can easily impose a hierarchical (subconcept-superconcept relation) structure on top of the 
general concepts in memory, such as that illustrated in Figure 5.3, as a heuristic device. Earlier on, 
both the concept-centred organisation of nets and many of the logical tools of predicate calculus 
were evident (albeit implicitly) in many of knowledge representation systems. For example, in 
reference to the GUS system [65,66] reports " ... now the contents of these slots in the dialog 
frames (and in lots of other frames that exist in the system) are typically other frames. These 
structures recurse to great depth. Of course they are not simply tree structures, but they are 
circular and point to one another; they're networks." Also, a translation of the main features 
of KRL  into a many-sorted predicate logic is provided in [67] which he takes to be the external 
meaning of KRL  expressions. 
The conspicuous remaining feature of frame-like systems is simply the idea of grouping pieces 
of knowledge which may be useful for understanding a particular concept or situation. In [67], 
it is clarified that a frame may be viewed as an n-ary relation between itself and its slots, which 
themselves may be viewed as binary relations and unary predicates. One could therefore represent 
a frame within the semantic network notation. The major difference between the 'Trames" view 
and the network view is one of function versus structure, as noted in [11,12]: "A memory structure 
is regarded as a frame because of the kinds of knowledge and capabilities attributed to it, rather 
than because of any specific structural properties." 
eThey state: "In most existing AI systems (and models of human memory) there is an undedying assumption 
that there is a single set of data linkages, used both for retrieval and for matddng and deduction . . . .  " They go 
on to say "We believe that the prescence of 'associative links' for retrieval is an addit ion~ dimension of memory 
structure which is not derivable from the logical structure being associated." 
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5.8. Superimposing Topical Otyanisations 
Research into semantic networks at the University of Alberta culminated in one solution to the 
so-called symbol mapping problem and in doing so, this group of researchers directly addressed 
organisational spects of semantic network representations, see [11,12]. The symbol mapping 
problem was originally posed in [33] as follows, "Suppose I tell you that a certain animal--let's 
call him Clyde--is an elephant. You accept his simple assertion and file it away with no apparent 
display of mental effort. And yet as a result of this simple transaction, you suddenly appear to 
know a great deal about Clyde. If I say that Clyde climbs trees or plays the piano or lives in a 
teacup, you will immediately begin to doubt my credibility. Somehow, "elephant" is serving as 
more than a mere label here; it is, in some sense, a whole package of relationships and properties 
and that package can be delivered by means of a single IS-A statement." 
In general a concept is characterized, though not defined, by its implications and these im- 
plications can be more or less essential to the meaning of a concept. For example, consider 
the following two statements: Johnny walked his pet boa constrictor daily and Johnny's boa 
constrictor has six legs or Boa constrictors are friendly, warm furry animal,. Both statements 
contradict boa constrictor properties, the latter alternatives contradicting an essential property. 
In the second statement, we are either violating necessary universal statements for parts (has 
six legs) or properties (friendly, warm, furry); in the first we are merely contradicting contingent 
properties (pets). 
Any system designed for reasoning about its world must efficiently exploit property inheri- 
tance within generalization (IS-A) hierarchies or relationship inheritance from components to 
corresponding components (PART-OF) hierarchies. What complicates this problem is that con- 
ceptual entities typically consist of many components, for example, parts of an object, the par- 
ticipants of an action, or the departments of an organisation. One possible solution is given by 
example. Consider a bird subhierarchy; it should be sufficient o specify the attachment rela- 
tionships between head, neck, body, legs, and tail at the top level, and this information should 
be visible from each particular kind or instance of bird. Consider the following fragments of bird 
knowledge: 
(Vr)[[r bird] =~ (3 s) (3 t) [Is part-oft] & It part-oft] & [s head] & It neck] & Is joins t]]] 
(Vu) [[u owl] =~ (Vv) (Vw) [Iv part-of u] & [w part-of u] & [v headl] & [w neckl] =~ Iv big] & [w short]]l 
(Vx) [[z emu] =~. (Vy) (Yz) [[y part-of x] & [z part-of x] & [y head2] & [z neck2] ::~ [y small] & [z long]I] 
We assume that in addition to the subconcept relationships that owl, emu are necessarily birds, 
that head1, head2 are necessarily heads, etc. Particularized owl's heads, etc. are partly intuitive 
(the picture it conjures in the mind) and partly anticipatory. We require a separate concept 
for each part of a thing as an attachment point for knowledge peculiar to it. This disjointed 
collection of propositions i redundant. Furthermore, nontrivial inference is required to transfer 
relationships from the bird context o the owl and emu contexts. There would be many such rela- 
tionships in a system generally knowledgeable about birds. Consider the alternative arrangement 
of these facts: 
(Vz) (3 y) (3 z) [[Ix bird] =~ [[y part-of z] & [z part-of z] & [y head] & [z neck] & [y joins z]]] 
& [[z owl] =~ [[y headl] & [z neckl] =~ [y big] & [z short]]] 
& [[z emn] =~ [[y head2] & [z neck2] ::~ [y small] & [z long]Ill 
Through variable sharing we have eliminated all redundancies. Moreover, parts relationships for 
birds now transfer trivially to owls and emus. Thus shared nodes can change character depending 
on viewpoint. In our bird propositions z represents any bird from one view, an owl from another, 
and an emu from another. Similarly, y and z represent different heads and necks depending on 
the point of view. 
Back-linking from shared variables to propositions hould be suppressed, since there is no 
benefit in having uniform access to all propositions in which such nodes participate. It is more 
The ECO family 119 
useful for general knowledge to be accessible via participating predicates, uch as "owl," "head," 
etc. 
We can generalise from our example and conclude that the knowledge associated with a gen- 
eralization hierarchy should be stored as a set of implicative propositions sharing one universally 
quantified node and any number of existentially quantified nodes dependent on the universally 
quantified node. The antecedents of the implications involve the universally quantified as argu- 
ment, and correspond to the concepts making up the generalization hierarchy. 
Unfortunately, the shared variable form of generalization hierarchies complicates the process of 
adding new information. New facts such as (Vz) [[z owl] ::~ [z predator]] cannot be simply added 
to the net by creation of a new variable node. Instead, this information must be inserted at the 
appropriate place in the appropriate hierarchy, with z replaced by the universal node of that 
hierarchy. 
We have only considered monadic oncept hierarchies and it seems possible to organise rela- 
tional concepts hierarchically as well. These will share more than one universal node, as exem- 
plified with the following fragment of the "ingests" hierarchy [We have suppressed time relations 
and other subtleties for simplicity, but see Section 6 below]: 
(Vz) (Vy) (Vu) (Vv) (Vw) [[k ingests y] =~ 
[[u orifice-of x] & k place] & [w place] & [v outside z] & [w inside z] & [y moving v w] & . . .  ]] 
& [[x eats y] [[y food] & [u mouth-of x]]] 
& [[z drinks y] :~ [[y liquid] & [u mouth-of x]]] 
& [[z snuffs y] :~ [[y powder] & [u mouth-of z]]] 
How many hierarchies are there? We imagine that the most hierarchies should be of the order 
of generality of CD's or PS's' primitives. 7 Thus there may be several dozens of hierarchies. 
Symbol mapping in a semantic network is facilitated by imposing asub-concept super-concept 
(IS-A) hierarchy on the network concepts. Thus Clyde's elephanthood immediately provides a 
handle on knowledge attached to the elephant concept. There is more at stake with Fahlman's 
"Clyde the elephant" than property inheritance. Mere access to elephant knowledge does not 
guarantee swift question-answering or consistency checking. Imagine hundreds of facts impinging 
on "Clyde," "elephant," mammal," etc. and attempt o do a Quillian-like activation search 
to particular attributes, such as colour or appearance. This would, in all likelihood lead to a 
combinatorial explosion when trying to construct inference chains to answer elatively simple 
queries like "What colour is Clyde?" or "Does Clyde live in a teacup?". 
To answer questions of the sort just posed, we classify propositions topically as colour propo- 
sitions, location propositions, ize propositions, etc. This classification scheme should help us to 
avoid the exhaustive search for combinations of propositions which yield a desired conclusion. 
Also, we provide access to just those propositions about a concept which belong to one of the 
topics. 
Our approach structures propositions associated with each concept according to a topic hierar- 
chy. A topic is defined as a predicate over proposition-concept pairs. For example, "colouring" is 
a predicate which is considered to be true for the proposition "a zebra has black and white stripes" 
in relation to the concept "zebra." Another topic predicate which is true for that proposition in 
relation to "zebra" is "appearance," in fact, "appearance" holds for any proposition-concept pair 
for which "colouring" holds, that is, "appearance" is a supertopic of "colouring," and conversely, 
"colouring" is a subtopic of "appearance." 
Topic predicates are stored in the semantic network, linked by subtopic and supertopic rela- 
tionships. Together, these form a topic hierarchy (or several topic hierarchies). Topic hierarchies 
provide a basis for organising the propositions attached to a node for a particular kind. A possible 
topic hierarchy for physical objects is shown in Figure 5.4, which portrays our attempt o com- 
prehensively classify knowledge about physical objects with minimal overlap between categories. 
7This may be the read significance of prindtives. 
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The subconcept topic is intended to be a slot not only for genuine subconcept relatio~hips (that 
is, necessary subsumption) but also for contingent subsumption relationships and for instances 
of a concept. Similar notions apply for superconcept relationships. 
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Figure 5.4. A topic hierarchy for physical objects. 
Once a topic hierarchy has been defined for a particular kind of node, propositions attached 
to any node of that kind can be organised according to the hierarchy. This is accomplished by 
superimposing a topic access skeleton upon the attached propositions. A topic access keleton 
mimics a part of the topic hierarchy, namely that part which is needed to supply access paths to 
all the available propositions about he node, when these are attached to the appropriate t rminal 
topics. Further examples and details of the use of topic hierarchies are given in [68,69]. 
For example, if the only facts known about Clyde are that he is an elephant and likes to 
eat peanuts, these would be attached to the access keleton. If elephants, in turn, are known 
to be very large, grey, rough-skinned mammals and Clyde is known to be an instance of an 
elephant, these facts would be attached to the access skeleton. Note that "texture" appears 
twice, making the "rough-skinned" predication available both as an aspect of appearance and as 
a tactile quality. In implementations a topic hierarchy and corresponding access keletons need 
not be strictly tree-structured since a single "texture" node can be used, with pointers to it from 
both the "appearance" and "tactile-quality" nodes. 
The insertion and retrieval of propositions in a topically organised semantic network in detail 
in [11]. In that discussion, topically organised networks are shown to assist the kinds of infer- 
ences about objects and their kinds. A mechanism for performing automatic topical classification 
of propositions is currently under investigation. Time and storage tradeoffs and a clever path 
contraction algorithm which guarantees descent time in the tree-like topic hierarchies, and subse- 
quent access to propositions they encode, to be proportional to log(nmax), the maximum number 
of propositions attached to any concept is given in [68]. 
6. SPECIAL PURPOSE INFERENCE MECHANISMS 
Topic hierarchies are obviously useful to organise the retrieval of information relevant o the 
implications of concepts, but the same ideas can be extended to other kinds of information about 
concepts. For example, time, part and colour information about concepts can be organised 
into structures which support the efficient use of that information. Another way to view the 
incorporation of this organisational knowledge is to simply view it as special purpose inference 
system augmenting an ordinary first order logic (FOL) theorem prover. From this point of view, 
the topic hierarchy is simply a specialist about the implications of being a concept instance. 
This perspective has given rise to the method of creating hybrid reasoners in which a general 
purpose FOL reasoner is augmented by special purpose methods that can efficiently reason about 
special relations in particular domains, see [30,70-73]. The ECO system is one of these hybrid 
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systems, supplementing itsgeneral purpose reasoner with special purpose methods for time, types, 
numbers (arithmetic relationships), sets, colours, strings (for string manipulation), and part-of 
relationships. 
The key to the efficiency of many of the specialists is their use of alternate representations, 
which enable the reasoning to be done by efficient algorithms that take advantage of special 
properties of the predicates, terms and functions in their domain. For example, the temporal 
specialist uses a partial order graph to represent temporal relationships and fast graph searching 
techniques to determine the relations, the type specialist uses a preorder numbering scheme 
on type hierarchies, and the colour specialist uses a cylindrical model of colour to determine 
relationships among colours. 
A significant problem for designers of hybrid systems is determining how to integrate the 
special reasoners into the general reasoner. Generally, the methods fall into one of two classes: 
those which operate at the "meta"-level, using their special abilities to improve the order in 
which available inference steps are applied, and those which operate at a "sub'-level, seeking 
to improve the power and efficiency of the inference steps used by the general reasoner. In the 
ECO system, all of the specialists are added as sub-level reasoners to a resolution-based general 
theorem-prover for predicate logic. At the sub-level, there are (at least) four ways in which a 
specialized reasoner can be added: 
(1) as an "evaluative" inference step, which directly evaluates truth values of litera]s, or sim- 
plifies functional terms; 
(2) by changing the unification procedure of the inference step to take into account some of the 
specialist's knowledge (for example, to disallow unification of variables that are "typed" 
with incompatible types, or to unify two constant symbols that in fact stand for the same 
domain concept); 
(3) by expanding the set of literais which lead to the possible application of an inference 
step (for example, in a resolution system a colour specialist might immediately identify 
white(~) and black(z) as incompatible clauses, or a type specialist might identify man(z) 
as being subsumed by human(a:)); and 
(4) as a completely new inference step (for example, the paramodulation step that is commonly 
added to resolution systems to incorporate the special theory of equality, see [74]). 
Specialists in the ECO system use the first three methods to integrate their knowledge back into 
the general reasoner. The details can be found in [14], which also discusses the relationship of 
(1) and (3) to Stickel's theory resolution, [75]. Aside from the specialized omain knowledge 
that is encoded into the specialist, specialists generally acquire knowledge by transforming state- 
meats in the language of the general reasoner into their own representational forms. Providing a 
mechanism which allows specialists to communicate with the general reasoner is only part of the 
solution to increasing the overall efficiency of a hybrid reasoner; as Levesque and Brachman ([50], 
p. 88) put it, "the trick with these hybrid systems is to factor the reasoning task so that spe- 
cialists are able to cooperate and apply their optimized algorithms without interfering with each 
other." Some steps towards solving this particular problem within the ECO system framework 
are described in [76]. Briefly, each specialist indicates to the general reasoner which predicates 
and functions are of potential interest o it. Additionally, it may also specify that it is interested 
in arguments of a certain "sort" (for example, the time specialist might be interested in any 
literal containing a "time" argument). When a fact is asserted, each of the interested specialists 
is given the fact to possibly assert within its own representational framework. During the infer- 
ence process, interested specialists are called upon to provide inferences as required, for example, 
to evaluate a function or to determine if two predicates are incompatible. Specialists can also 
put themselves on the "interested party list" of an argument they are particularly interested in. 
For example, if we know that John's wedding occurred in the month of May, but we don't know 
exactly when, the best we can do is assign the date some symbolic entity, say "dd ." The time spe- 
cialist would prefer to bound "dd" as closely as possible, so it will add itself to the interested party 
list of "dd." If at some later point we remember that (dd > 5), the number specialist will be in- 
terested in this (because of the predicate ">"), and set up "dd" with a minimum of 6. This is new 
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information about "dd ," so the time specialist will be called (as an intel~ested party), and it will 
in turn update its bounds on the date of John's wedding. 
In contrast o hybrid systems in which the specialists add expressive or inferential power to 
the overall system, for example, KL-TWO [72] and KRYPTON [30], ECO specialists employ 
alternate representations of the same knowledge available to the general reasoner, and serve only 
to accelerate inference. Thus, there is no requirement that a specialist be complete, as the general 
method can fill in any gaps, albeit less efficiently. As long as the operations a specialist is allowed 
to perform are equivalent to sets of standard eductive steps, the specialist (and thus the overall 
system) is guaranteed tobe logically sound, s The following sections describe the representational 
and inferential capabilities of several of the more complex specialists used by the ECO system. 
6.1. Time 
The time specialist described here is based on the specialist designed by Taugher and Schu- 
bert, [14], and includes some enhancements to handle both strict and nonstrict relations, and 
combinations of events, time points and absolute times in propositions, [77]. 
The representation used is a partial order graph that has been partitioned into "chains." All 
the points belonging to a chain are linearly ordered with respect o each other. There may be 
transitive arcs (redundant time-relations) between the points in a chain. Cross chain links define 
relations between points in one chain and points in another. 
For points within a chain, an arbitrary pseudo-time number is associated with each point. These 
numbers how the ordering relationship between points in a chain. In addition, the minimum 
point and the maximum point on the chain that a point can be equal to are stored with it--giving 
a range of points that can possibly be equal. These are used to show whether the relationship 
given by the pseudo times alone is strict or nonstrict (for example, < or <). Determining the 
relationship between any two points in the same chain can be done in constant time using these 
pseudo-times, while a graph search is required if they are on different chains. 
In addition to the time graph of time points, there is a metagraph of relations among chains. 
The cross chain links define arcs between chains in the metagraph. The metagraph is used to 
search for paths from one point to another. This process makes a graph search dependent on the 
number of cross chain links rather than the total number of time points resulting in a significant 
search savings. 
Figure 6.1 illustrates an example timegraph and metagraph. In the timegraph, small circles 
represent points on chain 1, small squares are points on chain 2, and small triangles represent 
points on chain 3. So circlel is before circle2, circle2 before circle3 and so on. There are cross 
chain links from trianglel to circlel (for example, trianglel is before circlel), from trianglel to 
squarel, from square2 to circlel, and one more from circle2 to square3. 
In the metagraph, these cross chain links show up as links between meta-nodes. There is one 
meta node for chain 1 (the big circle), one for chain 2 (the big square) and another for chain 3 
(the big triangle). The links within chains do not show up here, as within a chain they are not 
needed to determine relations. Following the cross chain links, we can get that trianglel is before 
square3, and squarel is before circle3, but no information about triangle2 and square3. 
Figure 6.1. Example Timegraph and Met~aph.  
SThls restriction is satisfied by the operations ECO specialists are allowed to participate in. 
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Furthermore, an absolute time (date) minimum and maximum are stored with each time point. 
These are a six-tuples of the form (year month day hour minute second), where each element may 
he numeric or symbolic (for example, (1987 04 a 12 b c) represents some time at or after 12 a.m. 
and before 1 p.m. of some day in April, 1987). Symbolic information may be filled in later by 
another assertion, or left unspecified throughout the session. Absolute time maxima propagate 
back to points before the given point (in the chain or on other chains), and minima propagate 
forward. This ensures that each point has the best absolute time information possible. Absolute 
time comparisons can sometimes be used to get a relation in constant ime between two points 
on different chains, avoiding a metagraph search. 
Insertion time into the graph is constant in most cases, except for propagation of absolute 
times or strictness values. In the worst case, propagation may require going to every point in the 
graph, although this is highly unlikely. Occasionally a chain may have to be renumbered, which 
requires going to all the points in a single chain. 
Creation of all supporting raph structures requires O(n + e) space and O(n + e) time, where 
n is the number of time points, and e is the number of relations between them. Determination 
of relations between points is based the metagraph, as the in-chain checking time is constant, 
so is O(m) where m is the number of cross-chain links and m << n ~ (m is "much less than" n 
squared). 
Duration minima and maxima (in seconds) are stored on the links between points. These 
may affect the absolute times around them, which are then propagated. They are also used in 
calculating duration between points where the path uses this link. Durations may be unspecified 
and are then treated as similar to unspecified absolute times, generating an evaluation request 
and adding to the interested party list of the concept. To determine the duration between any 
two points, an exhaustive search must be done between those points, calculating the duration 
along all paths to get the best one. This particular search uses a traditional depth first search 
over the entire time graph, rather than using the metagraph. Both duration information on arcs, 
and duration information implicit in absolute times are used. 
6.~. Types 
This specialist uses partitioning hierarchies of type predicates as a logically true representa- 
tion of the relationships among the predicates that appear in the hierarchy. A preorder num- 
bering scheme makes possible constant ime determinations of the relationships between pred- 
icates within the same hierarchy. For example, in the '2hing" hierarchy shown in Figure 6.2, 
"thing" is divided into "physical-object" and "abstract-object," which are further subdivided: 
"physical-object" into "living-thing" and "non-living-thing" and so on. The numbers following 
the predicates are assigned when the hierarchy is created or changed, and can be used to quickly 
determine subsumption or disjointness relationships. For example, "wolf' and "human" are dis- 
joint because there is no overlap between the numbering range associated with "wolf [38,38]" and 
"human [17,26]." "Wolf" is subsumed by "creature" because the numbering range associated 
with "wolf [38,38]" is within the numbering range associated with "creature [16,40]." 
The "thing" hierarchy is an "exclusion" hierarchy--all sibling nodes are mutually exclusive. 
"Overlap" hierarchies are also possible--in these, subsumption can be determined by the same 
method, but not disjointness. Hierarchies may also be inextricably intertwined, in that the same 
predicate can appear in several hierarchies, all "connected" at that predicate. For example, if 
"human" is partitioned in two different ways (minor, adult, etc., as in the '2hing" hierarchy; 
and Caucasian, Asian, Negro, etc., in another hierarchy), it is still possible to determine that 
Caucasian is subsumed by creature, simply by noting that "human" is subsumed by "creature" 
in the first hierarchy, and "Caucasian" is subsumed by "human" in the other. This works much 
like the metagraph in the time specialist--within each hierarchy the preorder numbering is used, 
and between hierarchies the connecting predicates are used. Thus, we can not only determine 
relationships between predicates in the same hierarchy, but also relations across hierarchies. 
In general, relationships among type predicates may define an arbitrarily complex graph that 
cannot be represented by a simple partitioning hierarchy (or even multiple intertwined hierar- 
chies). Nevertheless, the type specialist uses hierarchies because in practice most taxonomies 
CA~A 23:2-5-I 
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THING [1,112] 
PHYSICAL-OBJECT [2,108] 
LIVING-THING [3, 40] 
PLANT [4,15] 
c  VRZ [16,40] 
HUMAN [17, 26] 
ADULT [18,20] 
I MAN [19, 19] 
WOMAN [20,20] 
MINOR [21,26] 
iiT, 40] 
MICROBE [28.28] 
LARGER-ANIMAL [32,40] 
FISHLIKE-ANIMAL [33, 33] 
o , ,  
~%RM-BLOODED-QUADRAPED [37, 39] 
I WOLF [38, 38] 
FOX [39, 39] 
SIMIAN [40,40] 
NON-LIVING-THING [41,108] 
INANIMATE-NATURAL-OBJECT [42, 55] 
AR   ACT [S6,107] 
FO " [108,108] 
ABSTRACT-OBJECT [109,112] 
THOUGHT [Ii0, Ii0] 
IDEA [iii, III] 
GROUP [112,112] 
Figure 6.2. A partitioning type lzierardly for "thing." 
appear to fit reasonably well within a hierarchical framework, [14]. More to the point perhaps, 
is that efficient methods for unrestricted graphs do not appear to be within reach, [13]. In the 
ECO system, specialists are not required to be complete, which means that they can trade-off 
completeness for efficiency without sacrificing the completeness of the overall system. 
6.3. Parts 
The part-of structure of an object can be represented in essentially the same way as the taxon- 
omy of concept ypes. For example, Figure 6.3 depicts a partitioning raph which (exhaustively) 
partitions the human anatomy. The algorithms ketched for type hierarchies could be used to 
determine the truth values of such formulas as (backbone-of-John part-of spine-of-John) or the 
incompatibility of (z pelvis-of John) and (z left-leg-of John). However, consider the question 
"Is the spine part of y ?," where "y" is the combination of trunk and neck, as specified in the 
graph. Since "spine" and "y" are on different partitioning hierarchies, which are furthermore 
not connected by a part which can supply a transitive relationship between the two (that is, 
as "human" supplied a relationship for "Caucasian" and "creature"), the type specialist would 
answer "unknown." However, it should be possible to infer "yes," since the spine is divided fully 
into the neckbone and backbone, both of which have upward paths to "y." 
This additional complexity of parts graphs in comparison with type graphs has led to less 
restrictive structures for representing part-of relationships, at the cost of slightly less efficient 
algorithms. One such representational structure is a closed graph. A closed graph consists of one 
main hierarchy, along with any number of other hierarchies uch that all of the leaves of these 
hierarchies are also leaves of the main hierarchy. Figure 6.3 is almost a closed graph; it can easily 
be made into one by partitioning "z" (which intuitively represents the soft tissue of the body) 
into "zl" (which represents he soft tissue of the head), "z2," and so on. 
The inference algorithm for closed partitioning raphs (P-graphs) works by "projecting" nodes 
which do not lie on the main hierarchy into the main hierarchy. For example, the projection of 
"spine" into the main hierarchy is the set of nodes S = {neckbone, backbone} and for "y" it is 
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Each P-token represents a partitioning assertion dividing the node to which it is linked 
above into the nodes to which it is linked below. The solid lines define a partitioning 
hierarchy, and the broken lines define three additional, superimposed hiermr_hles. 
Figure 6.3. The upper levels of a partitioning raph for the human body. 
Y = {neck,trunk}. From these, it is easy to infer (by using a numbering scheme such as used for 
type hierarchies) that "spine" is part of "y," since all members of S have ancestors in Y. If the 
graph can be decomposed into hierarchies such that no node belongs to more than one of a few 
hierarchies, and nodes being compared usually belong to a common hierarchy, then expected time 
for a given comparison will be nearly constant (due to the numbering scheme) since a projection 
onto the main hierarchy will only be required in a few instances. 
The restrictions on the structure of closed P-graphs can be relaxed somewhat, by using semi- 
closed P-graphs. A semi-closed P-graph is one which is either a closed P-graph, or a semi-closed 
P-graph with another semi-closed P-graph attached to it by one of its main roots. Intuitively, a 
semi-closed P-graph allows for "entirely unrelated" partitionings of the same entity. More detail 
about the parts specialist can be found in [14]. 
6.J. Colollrs 
The colour specialist determines the relationships between colour predicates (for example, 
crimson is subsumed by red, and brown and blue are incompatible). At first glance, it would seem 
that the graphical structures used for types or parts would also be amenable to representing colour 
relationships. However, there axe several complications that are peculiar to colour predicates. 
For example, many colour shades overlap (for example, tan, midbrown, chocolate), and multiple 
partitionings would be needed to properly separate all of these shades into overlap and non-overlap 
relationships. Additional partitionings would also he needed to properly represent shades which 
straddle disjoint basic colours (for example, as lime straddles yellow and green). To deal with 
"hedged" colour relations, such as "lime is sort of yellow and sort of green," the partitioning 
graphs would have to be augmented with adjacency and/or apart-from relations, and even these 
partitionings would still not be able to represent colour properties uch as lightness, purity, 
saturation, and the warm/cool distinction. As an alternative to graphical representations, it 
appears that geometric representations are much better at representing these kind of colour 
relations, and that is why the colour specialist uses the cylindrical colour model depicted in 
Figure 6.4. 
This model, developed by Papalaskaris, [14], was arrived at by imagining that any colour is 
composed of some amount of a pure, monochromatic colour, plus certain amounts of black and 
white. 
There are three dimensions to this object: 
(1) hue this dimension runs through the continuum of rainbow hues, arranged in a circle and 
arbitrarily scaled from 0 to 12; 
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The eleven baldc colours in a (hue,, purity, dilution) colour space (with the cool shades "lifted away"). 
Purity decreases as bLaclc is added to a pure colonr, and dilution increases as white is added. 
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Figure 6.4. Colour cylinder with the ¢ool~ades rifted sway. 
(2) purity--the radial axis, parametrizes the amount of black present purity - pure colour 
/(pure colour + black) which decreases from 1 to 9 as black is added; and 
(3) dilution--axial dimension, parametrizes the amount of white present dilution -- white/ 
(pure colour + black + white) which increases from 0 to 1 as white is added. 
The model renders each English colour term simply as a region bounded by six coordinate 
surfaces, defined by three pairs of upper and lower bounds on hue, purity and dilution (so in the 
implementation each colour is represented by six numbers). With this geometry, it is possible 
to check any desired relationship between pairs of colour regions, such as inclusion, overlap, 
adjacency, and separation by using the corresponding geometric concepts. Hedged predicates axe 
handled by simply expanding the colour regions of the colours in question. 
7. CURRENT RESEARCH AND DIRECTIONS 
Research and development within the ECO family endures; we are trying to achieve the goal 
of developing an English language conversational system. Recent work on the inference n- 
gine has shifted our focus from a resolution-based predicate logic question-answering system [78] 
to an inference ngine which uses natural-deduction-like inference steps and is based on a new 
episodic logic which allows both the explicit content of narratives or dialogs and the world knowl- 
edge needed to understand them to be easily represented. This logical representation provides 
restricted qusntifiers, modal operators and propositional attitudes, predicate modifiers, nominal- 
ization operators, episodic variables, anaphoric variables, unreliable generalizations, and other 
non-standard constructs, see [79,80]. The new inference engine, named EPILOG, also performs 
input-driven inferencing to generate "interesting" conclusions before they are actually required 
to answer a question. Specialists may participate in this process, by making assertions back into 
the knowledge base of the general reasoner. Meaning postulate "axiom schemas" are supported, 
for example, a meaning postulate might assert that any concept that is described by a predicate 
modified by "very" can also be described by that predicate standing alone. Meaning postulate 
axiom schemas greatly reduce the number of rules required. A specialist to handle the "rneta- 
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predicates" that appear in these meaning postulates (for example, "action-pred ~)has been added, 
as have specialists for strings, arithmetic relationships, and set relationships, ee [81]. 
Work continues on the conversational system and on EPILOG at the Universities of Rochester 
and Alberta, and also at at Boeing Co., where EPILOG is an important part of a prototype 
message processing system, [82]. 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A little over ten years ago, we made a number of remarks about future directions, see [11,12]. 
It is instructive to briefly review some of those remarks now. We said, [12, p. 170], 
" . . .  an important future task will be the integration of uniform propositional representations 
with special-purpose r presentations, such as those required for efficient spacial, linguistic, and 
numerical information processing." 
I think it is safe to say that this integration has largely taken place, see [14,76-78]. We went on 
to say, [12, p. 170], 
" . . .  we need to transplant the parser to the topically organised net and expand it to handle 
at least noun phrase reference and bring into play the 'major implications' of verb concepts." 
Much work has been done on parsing since that statement was made, both in Alberta and by 
derivative groups of researchers, see [63,64,83]. Although, strictly speaking, the words of our 
quote have been performed, the intent may well remain elusive in its totality for some time. 
Another point worth considering is captured in the following "prediction," [12, p. 170], 
"With regard to knowledge organisation, we plan to continue the detailed evelopment of
generalization and topic hierarchies to determine how readily the full range of human concepts 
and human knowledge can be systematized in this way." 
We started well to tackle this task, nonetheless, the "full range" has proven somewhat elusive to 
this point. 
We pointed out the potential for learning within the topically oriented network organisation 
and our desire to better understand our conception of the question-answering and problem-solving 
processes. This potential for learning and our better understanding remain to he fully exploited. 
Progress, however incremental, is steady and apparent and we expect o report additional suc- 
cesses in the years to come. Additional research needs to be undertaken before it will be possible 
to accurately access how daunting a task lies ahead in dealing with the overall general problems 
of knowledge representation a d organisation. A hopeful sign is the fact that at least over the 
past decade many additional researchers have generated a wealth of new research results in these 
areas and the computational paradigm is now being much more widely applied. 
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